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Local expenditures in neighbouring municipalities can be spatially interdependent 
due to spillovers, cooperation effects, competition effects or mimicking. In this 
paper, we aim to test the spatial interdependence of local public expenditures using 
data on 205 Czech municipalities. We found positive spatial interdependence in 
expenditures on housing and culture and negative spatial interdependence for 
expenditures on industry and infrastructure and environmental protection. 
Additionally, we observed that political characteristics affect the size of spending; 
left-wing parties tend to increase expenditures on culture and decrease expenditures 
on industry and infrastructure; and  higher party fragmentation decreases overall 
capital expenditures and expenditures on housing. 
 
Keywords: spillovers, fiscal competition, local public finance  
 
JEL: C72, H77, R12 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author is grateful to Karel Janda, Martin Gregor, the seminar audiences at the 
Institute of Economic  Studies, Charles University in Prague for their helpful 
comments. Financial support by GACR 402/08/0501 and GAUK 3121/2008 grants 





















Recently, a great deal of attention has been devoted to studying the spatial 
interdependence of local public policies. This aspect of the literature has developed within 
the scope of fiscal federalism, in particular, within the discussion on the decentralization 
of fiscal policies as a potential source of competition among local governments. 
Local policies are interdependent if fiscal decisions in neighboring jurisdictions play 
an important role in the decision of domestic jurisdiction. Until recently, these aspects 
were analyzed only for tax policy and the literature on spatial tax competition developed 
(see Hayashi and Boadway 2001; Revelli 2002; Bordignon et al. 2003; Allers and Elhorst 
2005; Bosch and Sol´e-Oll´e 2007). Recently, the analysis has been extended to public 
expenditures and one of the reasons behind this was the fact that many local governments 
do not have large tax competencies. 
Fiscal interactions among local governments can be driven by various effects: (i) 
positive or negative spillovers affecting residents of other districts; (ii) competition 
between regions to attract residents and businesses; (iii) mimicking driven by yardstick 
competition and imperfectly informed authorities; and finally, (iv) cooperation and 
coordination between local governments. These effects are discussed in a greater extent in 
next section. 
If we empirically test the theoretical hypotheses of the potential drivers of fiscal 
interactions, the common way to proceed is to estimate the fiscal reaction function, i.e. the parameters that indicate whether any particular local government will change an expendi-
ture level in response to changes in other local governments.
Empirical literature on the spatial interdependence of public expenditures was initiated
by a pioneering study by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), who estimate an empirical model of
strategic interaction in expenditures among state governments in the United States. Brueck-
ner (2003) provides the overview of empirical studies dealing with spatial interdependence.
Strategic interaction among local governments is empirically explored in Brueckner (1998).
He focuses on the adoption of growth-control measures by municipalities in California and
seeks evidence of policy interdependence. Lundberg (2001) tests for the eﬀects of recre-
ational and cultural expenditures in Swedish municipalities and he shows that municipalities
with similar expenditure levels are clustered to a greater extent. Revelli (2002b) explores
neighborhood eﬀects in social service provisions: He proves that the source of spatial auto-
correlation in social spending is endogenous mimicking among neighboring localities.
Sol´ e-Oll´ e (2005) presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from local expen-
diture policies and estimates a reaction function with interactions between local governments
using data on Spanish local governments. Borck, Caliendo and Steiner (2006) study ﬁscal
competition between jurisdictions via the size and structure of public spending. They model
the reaction functions of jurisdictions on public spending in neighboring regions and esti-
mate these functions for German communities. They found signiﬁcant positive reactions for
facilities encouraging business development, for general administration and for supporting
business enterprises.
Foucalt, Madi` es and Paty (2007) analyze interactions concerning diﬀerent categories of
local public spending among French municipalities. They found signiﬁcant interdependence
only for cities whose mayors share the same partisan aﬃliation. Ermini and Santolini (2007)
test public spending interdependence among Italian jurisdictions and found signiﬁcant in-
teraction between their spending both at the level of total expenditure and also for diﬀerent
sub-categories. Werck, Heyndels and Geys (2008) found evidence that Flemish municipal-
ities’ cultural expenditures are positively aﬀected by the level of cultural spending of their
neighbors. Redoano (2007) contributes with an estimation of the spatial interdependence of
ﬁscal policies in European countries.
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical aspect of this literature. We aim to test the
existence of the spatial interdependence of local public expenditures using data on 205 Czech
municipalities. We test the hypothesis that municipality councils in their decisions on public
expenditures take into account decisions of neighboring municipalities. We focus mainly on
expenditures on industry and infrastructure, culture, sports and recreation, housing, utilities
and regional development and environmental protection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses potential drivers of spatial interde-
pendence, Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 outlines the estimation technique, discussing
potential weighting matrices and gives estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Fiscal interactions among local governments can be explained by various eﬀects stemming
either from non-cooperative or cooperative behavior. The main sources of the strategic in-
teraction in the non-cooperative setup are spillovers, ﬁscal competition and yardstick com-
petition.1
The positive/negative spatial interdependence of local spending in games with non-
cooperative governments is equivalent to local spending being strategic complements/strategic
substitutes. The sign of interdependence is very sensitive to the institutional environment,
especially by the revenue-sharing of matching grant systems. In addition, when supporting
local businesses, the structure of local production matters.
1Revelli (2006) speciﬁes channels of interaction in line with the above-mentioned sources such as prefer-
ences, constraints and expectations.
2(i) The ﬁrst and the foremost source is the presence of spillover eﬀects. The beneﬁts of
public spending in domestic regions can easily spill over to neighboring regions (Gordon
1983). This additional welfare eﬀect inﬂuences local governments’ decisions on its pub-
lic spending in neighboring jurisdictions. We can observe either a positive or negative
correlation among neighbors’ public expenditures resulting from its substitutability or
complementarity, respectively.
The provision of cultural goods such as museums and cinemas, environmental protec-
tion or building new infrastructure in one region can increase the welfare of residents
in surrounding jurisdictions, because they can utilize these goods and services. The
optimal reaction of local government to this positive welfare eﬀect would be to free-
ride on neighboring regions, decrease their expenditure on the particular policy and
reallocate resources to diﬀerent policies.
On the other hand, some policies pursued in one region can have negative consequences
in a neighboring region because they harm its residents and decrease their utilities. For
example, greater business support and subsequent development of industry and infras-
tructure can deteriorate the environment in surrounding jurisdictions. Consequently,
they have to spend more on environmental protection.
(ii) The second source of the strategic interaction can be denoted as ﬁscal competition.
More attractive public goods in neighboring regions can decrease the inﬂow of po-
tential residents and potential businesses or can cause an outﬂow of current mobile
residents and mobile businesses operating in a domestic region, and therefore decrease
the welfare of its residents.
This idea stems from the hypothesis that individuals “vote with their feet” and move
to a community that provides the desired level of public goods, given the underlying
resource costs.
A higher amount of residents and businesses in a region imply higher revenues for its
local government and more public goods. Moreover, businesses provide job oppor-
tunities resulting in economic growth in problematic regions, increases in purchasing
power of population, and the elimination of negative consequences related to high
unemployment.
Thus, local governments have incentives to attract people to settle in their region and
encourage new businesses to operate there. This can lead to competition among local
governments via speciﬁc types of spending resulting in spatial interdependence.
Keen and Marchand (1997) are among the ﬁrst authors who explore spending com-
petition. They state that under ﬁscal competition too much is spent on public goods
beneﬁting local business and too little on public goods beneﬁting residents, which
stems from labor immobility. Matsumoto (2000) and Borck (2005) further extend this
paper theoretically.
The fact that some municipalities in the Czech Republic care about their population
size is demonstrated in the special example of Jihlava, Hradec Kr´ alov´ e, Kol´ ın and
some other municipalities that have in the past actually paid people to reside there
(Koval´ ık 2006, Mackov´ a 2006). However, their behavior was driven by the revenue-
sharing system in which revenues per capita are bracketed by the population level. For
municipalities at the upper bound of the bracket, the incremental beneﬁt of ending up
in a higher bracket is enormous.
(iii) Local governments may also mimic decisions on the public goods provisions of its
neighbors. There are two main channels through which this behavior occurs. Firstly,
it is explained by yardstick competition: If incompletely informed voters evaluate the
performance of their government, they can take the policies pursued by its neighbors
as a yardstick (see Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995; Revelli 2002a), because they
do not have information on the costs of running the oﬃce or public service provision.
3This reasoning is further extended in Ashworth and Heyndels (2000) in the context
of taxation. They construct a speciﬁc behavioral hypothesis and argue that voters
receive extra rewards from superior policies or extra disutility from inferior policies if
compared to policies in neighboring regions.
Secondly, it can be the local government that is incompletely informed. To avoid infor-
mation costs such as the costs of analyzing the demand of its residents or of elaborating
cost-beneﬁt analysis the local government can tend to mimic its own neighbors.
(iv) Finally, we have to consider possible cooperation and coordination. On the contrary to
the previous eﬀects that are strategic and all arise from the non-cooperative setup, this
one stems from the cooperative game. Neighboring municipalities can work on joint
projects; they can jointly ﬁnance infrastructure, recreational services, environmental
protection or some common networks. Municipalities can also exchange ideas and
experiences or learn each from other.
In exceptional cases, municipalities can engage in the deeper process of cooperation
and even specialize. However, beneﬁts of specialized public good provisions spread
from one municipality to another through spillover channels. Although the initial
stimulus counts towards cooperation, as a consequence it is the existence of spillovers
that are the cause of spatial interdependence.
Cooperation among municipalities as a source of spatial interdependence is seldom
discussed in this literature. One of the few studies on this topic is by Petermann
Reifschneider (2006) who constructs models of cooperation between competing juris-
dictions.
Czech legislature serves as a good example in giving a legal basis for cooperation
among municipalities; municipalities can either cooperate in voluntary associations,
form partnerships, or their cooperation can be based on some contract made to ful-
ﬁll a special task. According to a survey carried by researchers from the Institute
of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences in the Czech Republic (see Vajdov´ a et al.
2006), voluntary associations of municipalities are nearly always formed by small mu-
nicipalities whose own budgets are too tiny to carry forward certain projects. These
association are mostly focused on regional development, tourism, environment, waste
treatment, energy issues and infrastructure.
Table 1. Sources of spatial interdependence
Cooperative Non-cooperative





Negative Specialization Positive spillover/externality
Alternative theoretical hypotheses of the potential eﬀects driving spatial interdependence
summarized in Table 1 give rise to similar responses in the size of local public expenditures.
Therefore, it is very diﬃcult to attribute the observed behavior to a unique theoretical model.
In some cases, eﬀects can even fade into one another. Still, there exist some empirical
strategies to identify the particular model as shown by Revelli (2006), but they require
additional data.
In this paper, we do not distinguish between various hypotheses driving the spatial pat-
tern, because we do not have the instruments and data for it. However, something can be
learned from this observed type of interdependence; for example, negative spatial interde-
pendence can be interpreted above all by the spillover hypothesis, because specialization is
very rare.
4Some theoretical hypotheses can be also precluded for particular expenditures groups.
For cultural expenditures we hardly see cooperation as suggested by the survey mentioned
above. Similarly, for expenditures on municipal services very narrowly focused on the welfare
of residents, the cooperation and spillover hypothesis is at least probable. In addition,
various models can operate on diﬀerent spatial scales. Yardstick competition, spillovers and
cooperation tend to take place in close neighborhoods, however ﬁscal competition can occur
also on a greater spatial scale.
3 Data
There were ﬁve tiers of government in the Czech Republic in the year 2006; the central
government, 14 regions (territorial self-governing districts, NUTS 3), 205 municipalities
with extended powers, 393 municipalities with an authorized municipal oﬃce and 6,248
municipalities (basic territorial units, NUTS 5).2
A municipality with extended powers is at the same time a municipality with an autho-
rized municipal oﬃce and a sole municipality. Various types of municipality administration
statutes diﬀer in their powers and responsibilities. Municipalities with extended powers
control territory with other municipalities and are responsible for social transfers payments,
social care, water industry, environment protection and infrastructure in the region.
In our analysis, we used cross-sectional data on municipalities with extended powers in
2006. These municipalities represent small centers in their districts and all the administrative
agencies, banks, businesses, culture services are concentrated here. Therefore, they are
perfectly suitable for studying spatial interdependence.3 To illustrate, Figure 1 shows how
the Czech Republic is split into these districts.
Figure 1. Districts of municipalities with extended powers in the Czech Republic
2Until the end of 2002, the structure was diﬀerent: instead of 14 regions there were 91 administrating
districts. Later, these districts existed only as territorial districts, NUTS 4, with no public administration
competencies. After the reform around 20% of the competencies were shifted from districts to the regions,
and 80% to municipalities with extended powers.
3Other municipalities do have less competencies, along with a tiny and not-so-variable budget. For
homogeneity, we exclude the capital city of Prague since its current expenditures per capita are two times
higher than the maximum from our sample.
5The Ministry of Finance provides the complete database of municipality budgets (ARIS)
providing a very detailed overview of municipality expenditures.4 We focus on the overall
expenditures and on four expenditure groups that are the most interesting from our point of
view: expenditures on housing, utilities and regional development, industry and infrastruc-
ture, culture, sports and recreation and environmental protection. Housing, utilities and
regional development spending includes expenditures on the development of the housing
economy, municipal utilities such as public lighting and local services, town planning, ter-
ritorial development and administration related to these tasks; industry and infrastructure
contains expenditures on industrial support, trade and services support, expenditures on
roads, public transportation and on telecommunications; the culture, sports and recreation
group includes spending on on cultural activities, sports events, sport clubs and recreational
services; ﬁnally, environmental protection expenditures include air protection, waste treat-
ment, underground water protection, soil protection and nature protection.
We analyze both capital and current expenditures for each group. Capital expenditures
represent investments to buildings and infrastructure which can create spillovers, be instru-
ment for ﬁscal competition, cause mimicking and municipalities can cooperate within them;
therefore, they are the most suitable for our analysis. On the other hand, current expen-
ditures mainly reﬂect how much of a public good is provided; they represent the costs of
operating public facilities. Still, there is a limitation of these expenditures, as municipalities
diﬀer in cost eﬃciency or they can force diﬀerent labor costs. We expect to ﬁnd a stronger
spatial interdependence eﬀect for capital expenditures.5
In the model of the interaction of local public expenditure, we have to include the various
socio-economic and political characteristics of local jurisdictions. The economic performance
of a municipality can inﬂuence its expenditures. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
the GDP for this level of government, but we could approximate it by the average gross
wage. However, this control can bias results due to its correlation with other demographical
variables, such as the share of university-educated people, therefore, it is not used.6 Budget
constraint is important for spending, so we include grants and subsidies per capita. We
disregard tax revenues per capita as they are potentially endogenous. Past liabilities can
also inﬂuence decisions on public expenditures, so we include the one year lagged indicator
of debt service.7
We also have data on the ﬁnancial health of municipalities in 2005 in the form of the
ﬁnancial score computed by the Czech Credit Bureau, Inc.8 This indicator can be potentially
correlated with other economic variables, so we should use it with caution.
Additionally, jurisdictional demographic characteristics can aﬀect public spending be-
cause they represent the needs and preferences of the population for public goods and ser-
vices. The demand for public spending is determined by population structure and education.
So, we include a share of old people (above 65 years) and young people (below 15 years), or
a share of people in a productive age, depending on which one works better, and a share of
people above 15 years of age with a university education.9
Municipality size in terms of its population can also inﬂuence spending; larger municipal-
ities can spend more per capita because of providing more types of services. We furthermore
test the impact of the density of a population representing the measure of the rate of urban-
4http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/hs.xsl/aris.html
5The analysis of current expenditures is useful especially in cases when there is a great variability of
capital expenditures among municipalities, and some do not spend anything.
6In a previous version of the paper, wage was included in the estimation together with unemployment
rate, but they were nearly always insigniﬁcant.
7The indicator of debt service is computed as ISP = r/t, where r is the sum of interest payments and
installments of stock and bonds, and t is the sum of tax revenues, non-tax revenues and subsidies from the
state budget.
8The ﬁnancial score is part of the iRating constructed by CCB, Inc. for each municipality in the Czech
Republic. It includes 20 ﬁnancial indicators; each is evaluated on a scale from minus 25 to plus 25 in a larger
sample of all municipalities (not only those with extended powers). The total ﬁnancial score is the weighted
average of all indicators. To avoid negative numbers, we adjust the scale from 0 to 50.
9The most recent data of this indicator was collected in the 2001census .
6ization. Denser municipalities can exploit economies of scale. Given our data, it does not
hold in the Czech Republic that large municipalities are denser, therefore we include both
variables in the estimation.
We also introduce political variables to control for characteristics of local governments
ruling in 2006 (and which were elected in 2002). Generally, we would like to know whether
the ideology of a local government aﬀects the level of its spending. Unfortunately, it is
almost impossible to recognize the political ideology of parties at the municipal level except
with the main political parties operating simultaneously at the national level. Therefore, we
construct dummy variables indicating that either the Communist party or Social Democratic
party, major Czech left-wing parties, was the winner of municipality elections in 2002 and
try to verify that left-wing governments have greater incentives to spend more.
Furthermore, we also use party fragmentation. The number of parties and their relative
power can also inﬂuence decisions on government spending, especially in cases of major
investment decisions. We compute a Herﬁndahl index for party concentration in the local
council which is generally used as an indicator of party fragmentation within the council.
And ﬁnally, due to spillovers from very large municipalities that can occur for speciﬁc
expenditures, we form dummy variable indicating municipalities that border on large munici-
palities with more than 40,000 inhabitants. Variables and summary statistics of expenditures
and exogenous variables can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total expenditures 22809 5415 14866 58053
Capital expenditures 6689 4020 1124 40337
Current expenditures 16121 3126 11248 33206
Housing, utilities and regional development 3447 2920 628 34096
Industry and infrastructure 3428 2219 395 15816
Culture, sports and recreation 2859 1542 457 9947
Environmental protection 1208 593 24 3684
Population 23261 38371 2892 366680
Population density (per km
2) 143.80 174.30 32.00 1592.80
Share of youth 14.46 1.09 12.11 18.86
Share of people in a productive age 71.40 1.32 67.07 75.24
Share of elderly 14.14 1.51 9.69 17.44
Share of university-educated people 6.26 1.85 2.54 17.93
Subsidies per capita 1796.16 1821.42 162.00 15474.00
Debt service indicator 5.81 6.29 0.00 49.56
Financial score 17.47 5.09 6.78 30.77
Left-wing parties 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Party concentration 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.51
Source: Czech Statistical Oﬃce (www.czso.cz); CCB, Inc.; Ministry of Finance.
Note: N = 205. Expenditures per capita (Czech koruna).
As we can see from Table 2, we can observe large diﬀerences in the capital expenditures in
municipalities. Some municipalities carry investment projects and some do not. To smooth
out the diﬀerences and to control for the fact that some municipalities hold investments in
one year and some in the following year, we use three-year averages (2004-2006) for capital
expenditures.
4 Estimation
To test whether spending is spatially interdependent in Czech municipalities, we aim to
estimate a general reaction function in (1). In the spatial lag model, the estimated equation
7for the vector of spending z can be written as
z = βWz + θX + ￿, (1)
where the matrix X represents control variables, the matrix W deﬁnes the neighborhood,10
￿ is a vector of errors, and β and vector θ are parameters to be estimated.
There are two major issues arising from the estimation of this spatial lag model as
Brueckner (2003) states; endogeneity of the z’s and possible spatial error dependence. En-
dogeneity in this context originates from the fact that for neighboring locations ij, zj enters
on the right hand side of the equation for zi, but zi also enters on the right hand side of the
equation for zj.
To address the endogeneity problem, we should estimate the model by one of the two
main techniques used for spatial processes models:11 maximum likelihood estimation and
instrumental variables estimation.
The second problem of estimating (1) can be the spatial error dependence arising when
￿ includes omitted variables that are spatially dependent. This eﬀect can be explained by
unmodelled shocks that spill over across units of observation and thus result in spatially
correlated errors. In this case, the error vector ￿ satisﬁes:
￿ = ρV ￿ + ξ, (2)
where V is the weighting matrix that can be the same as W in (1), ρ is an autoregressive
parameter to be estimated and ξ is a random error term typically assumed to be i.i.d.12
This problem can be solved by using the estimation technique called generalized spatial
two-stage least squares procedure (GS2SLS) introduced in Kelejian and Prucha (1998) that
consists of three steps; (i) to compute 2SLS estimates in (1);13 (ii) to derive residuals ￿ from
the ﬁrst step and estimate ρ in (2) by GMM as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999);
(iii) to reestimate (1) by 2SLS after transforming the model via a Cochrane-Orcutt type
transformation to account for spatial correlation.
In our analysis, we use various estimation techniques and compare results. Firstly, we
estimate the spatial lag model as is expressed in (1) by maximum likelihood and test for
spatial error autocorrelation. In the case it is present we reestimate the model by GS2SLS.
If even after that we do not get satisfying results, we estimate the spatial error model in (2)
by maximum likelihood.14
4.1 Neighborhood matrix
The crucial point of study is the construction of a neighborhood weighting matrix. This is
fundamental when dealing with spatial correlation since it introduces the potential spatial
correlation among units of observations. In our study we consider various matrices. For each
matrix, we test for spatial autocorrelation which can be measured by Moran’s I statistics
(Moran 1948).
All weighting matrices are based on geographical speciﬁcation. The simplest matrix
that can be used is the ﬁrst-order neighborhood matrix. It positively weights only those
municipalities, with which it shares a common border. Borders are not borders of the
10Note that weighs for its own spending on the diagonal wii are always zero.
11Recent alternative estimation methods use maximum entropy, etc. (LeSage & Pace 2004).
12Kelejian and Prucha (2006) have recently developed a new technique for how to estimate ρ for het-
eroscedastic innovations ξ.
13As is standard in spatial econometrics literature, we instrument z by X and WX (e.g. Heyndels and
Vuchelen, 1998; Soll` e-Oll` e, 2005; Geys, 2006; Werck, Heyndels and Geys, 2008). The Sargan test of the
overidentifying restrictions suggests that our instruments are valid for cases when we get signiﬁcant eﬀects
of control variables.
14For maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial lag model, we assume that errors are i.i.d., and of the
spatial error model we assume that there is no spatial lag dependence, z = θX + ￿. ML estimation brings
more accurate results than its IV counterpart (Das et al. 2003).
8municipality itself, but of a district which is controlled by the municipality with extended
powers.
Additionally, we can construct the neighborhood matrix based on distance bands. For
this purpose, we collect spatial coordinates for each municipality and study spatial autocor-
relation for diﬀerent distance bands. Only municipalities lying within a given distance band
are weighted positively.
Finally, in our neighborhood matrix we want to express the fact that municipalities can
weight decisions on expenditures of similar municipalities more. This matrix is based on the
geographical neighborhood deﬁned by the distance band, but the weights are not the same
for all neighbors.15
Table 3. Moran’s I test for various neighborhood matrices
W W20 W25 W30 W35 WS20 WS25 WS30 W35
Current expenditures
















∗ 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.089




























































Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. W is the ﬁrst-order neighborhood
matrix; W20, W25, W30 and W35 are matrices based on a given distance band in kilometers; WS20,
WS25, WS30 and WS35 denote matrices based on similar characteristics and given distance band. All are
nonstandardized. Expenditures groups are denoted as follows: industry and infrastructure (II), culture,
sports and recreation (CS), housing, utilities and regional development (HD) and environmental protection
(EP). (ALL) means the total expenditures of given type.
Table 3 presents the results of the spatial autocorrelation test Moran’s I for various
expenditure groups using the various matrices suggested above. We use distance bands
from 20 to 35 kilometers, which are the most reasonable.16 Signiﬁcant results indicate
that municipalities’ expenditures cluster in space and we should be suspicious of spatial
interdependence.
If we compare various types of matrices, we can see that those that take into account
the diﬀerences of municipalities’ characteristics perform the best for almost all expenditures
groups. The results also suggest that relevant neighborhood size is diﬀerent for various
expenditures groups and verify that the distinction among current and capital expenditures
is important due to the observed diverse spatial autocorrelation pattern.
4.2 Estimation results
In this section, we aim to estimate whether local public expenditures in Czech municipalities
are spatially interdependent. We mainly focus on capital expenditures as there is a higher
potential of interaction. However, the results in Table 3 illustrate the diﬀerent spatial
15We characterize municipalities by K variables: population size, population density, share of young and
old people, share of university-educated people, average gross wage and unemployment rate. Each variable
xk, k ∈ K is normalized from 0 to 1. The weight of the municipality lying within the distance band is given






16For a distance band of 15 kilometers there are 72 municipalities having no neighbors; for 40 kilometers,
the average number of neighbors is greater than 11.
9patterns in scale for current and capital expenditures on housing, utilities and regional
development, therefore we also analyze its current spending. Concerning expenditures on
environmental protection, the data on capital expenditures is very weak, because almost
28% of municipalities do not spend anything. Thus, in this case, we study the current and
capital expenditures together.
We work with three neighbourhood matrices, WS20, WS25 and WS30, for which we
observed highest spatial autocorrelation.
We ﬁrstly estimate the model by the maximum likelihood spatial lag model and con-
struct Moran’s I to test for spatial error autocorrelation. In the case that spatial error
autocorrelation is signiﬁcant, we reestimate the model by GS2SLS.
Table 4 presents partial results out of maximum likelihood estimation. Parameter β
expresses the spatial interdependence eﬀect and the error columns show Moran’s I test for
spatial error autocorrelation. The complete results are available in the Appendix.
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimation - spatial lag model
WS20 WS25 WS30

































Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
The results are in line with the previous Table 3. In cases of strong spatial autocorrela-
tion, we observe high β. Nevertheless, it is mostly insigniﬁcant. In the following analysis,
we disregard neighborhoods that are less relevant for each expenditure groups. Except for
current expenditures on housing, utilities and regional development and capital expenditures
on culture, sports and recreation, we have to reestimate all the models by GS2SLS, as we
detected a spatial error autocorrelation.
Even if GS2SLS does not help and we might reject the hypothesis of the nonzero spatial
lag dependence, we use the maximum likelihood error model. In the case of overall expendi-
tures, we do not detect any spatial process, thus we use the simple OLS regression. Table 5
shows the ﬁnal results.17
17Controls have been chosen according to a large sensitivity analysis carried out. Detailed results are
available upon request. For environmental expenditures we add two more special variables, such as altitude
and a dummy for large cities having more than 40,000 inhabitants.
10Table 5. Estimation results
Current Capital Total
HD II CS HD ALL EP ALL
Neighborhood WS20 WS25 WS20 WS30 WS25 WS20 WS25

























People in prod. age 53.27
∗
Old people −69.40 71.31 108.1
∗ −50.01 210.2
∗∗ −141.0
University education −16.62 183.6













Left-wing parties 234.8 −319.9
∗ 298.6
∗ −123.5 55.97 50.42 −668.4
Party concentration 5614.5
∗∗∗ 1494.3 −735.5 5971.3
∗∗∗ 5335.7
∗ 401.7 5516.5




Large city dummy 386.8
∗∗
Constant 1222.3 −211.5 −3925.3 4255.2




Log likelihood −1593.19 −1554.04 −1843.37
Sargan test 8.402 10.635 9.284
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Spatial lag dependence was found for all expenditures groups except for overall capital
expenditures, for which at least spatial error dependence was detected. Firstly, we look at
the sign of interdependence.
Negative spatial interdependence
For expenditures on environmental protection and expenditures on industry and infrastruc-
ture, we obtained the negative coeﬃcient of spatial lag. This ﬁnding supports the spillover
hypothesis. The beneﬁts of public goods provided in neighboring municipalities spill over
to the domestic municipality, which can thus reallocate resources to diﬀerent local policies.
Air and water pollution are classic examples of negative externalities in economic litera-
ture. It is costly to eliminate pollution originating from a neighboring municipality and the
lower the pollution externality is, the less a municipality has to spend on its elimination.
Higher expenditures on environmental protection in neighboring municipalities imply lower
domestic spending, and therefore, expenditures are negatively spatially interdependent.
Surprisingly, the spillover hypothesis was also assigned to capital expenditures on in-
dustry and infrastructure. Public infrastructure represents mainly networks, such as roads,
telecommunications or railways, so it is expected that the higher stock of capital in one
jurisdiction will increase the production in other jurisdictions. The domestic workforce can
also beneﬁt from ﬁrms producing in neighboring regions due to commuting. These spillovers
seem to outweigh the potential competition eﬀect, when neighboring regions behave as rivals
and compete among each other for ﬁrms through these expenditures. Or diﬀerent compe-
tition channels can exist that are not included in these expenditures. Some regions can
have a more high-skilled labor force, special government investment incentives for ﬁrms, or
property tax matters can also exist.18
Positive spatial interdependence
18Property tax is the only tax that can be partly set by municipalities, but the diﬀerences are not large.
11Positive spatial interdependence was discovered for current and capital expenditures on
housing, utilities and regional development, and for capital expenditures on culture, sports
and recreation. Concerning the latter, this spending can have large spillovers as there may
be a high degree of substitutability of leisure activities across municipalities. People can be
almost indiﬀerent as to whether to consume these goods in domestic or other municipalities.
Spillovers then give rise to free-riding and negative spatial interdependence.
In our case, the results suggest opposite and diﬀerent eﬀects, mimicking or competition,
matter.19 Municipalities hardly aim at attracting new residents via the support of cultural
and sport life. More likely, they mimic each other. Due to strong spillovers, information
on cultural and sports events spreads easily to neighboring regions, and the absence of any
leisure activities in the domestic municipality appears worse when neighboring municipal-
ities provide these services and goods. Thus, higher expenditures on leisure activities in
neighboring municipalities can put pressure on the domestic government to increase these
expenditures.
Another expenditures group of interest is housing, utilities and regional development
spending. Capital spending is mostly related to housing construction. In large neighbor-
hoods, this spending has proven to be spatially interdependent. The main aim of housing
construction support is to attract new people to settle in the region. Therefore, the positive
spatial interdependency can be attributed to the ﬁscal competition hypothesis.
Positive interdependence in current expenditures referring to the size of pure municipal
services cannot be explained by cooperation, as they are narrowly targeted to the welfare
of residents. These expenditures probably do not even inﬂuence people’s decisions as to
whether to reside in the region or not, so a ﬁscal competition hypothesis can be precluded.
Finally, we are left with the last possible eﬀect of mimicking.
Spatial error dependence
For some groups we also ﬁnd signiﬁcant spatial error dependence. This eﬀect shows that
municipalities face some external shock. Another source of this dependence may come from
omitted variables that are related through space.
Speciﬁc policies such as business development or other investments can be supported by
particular regional governments controlling territory with more municipalities with extended
powers. There can also exist state regulation targeting speciﬁc regions, such as the “Natura
2000” ensuring protection of birds. Or weather conditions matter, such as ﬂoods aﬀecting
municipalities lying within large region that are forced to build new infrastructure.
Let us brieﬂy discuss the eﬀects of some control variables. Larger municipalities in terms
of its population tend to spend more on culture, sports and recreation, housing construction
and on overall capital expenditures. This conﬁrms the fact that cultural life concentrates in
larger cities that are, at the same time, more capable of carrying out investment projects,
such as housing construction.
Population density negatively inﬂuences overall capital spending, which veriﬁes the ex-
istence of economies to scale. If the municipality provides some capital goods, then the
marginal costs of additional users are close to zero. Economies of scale are also observed for
environmental expenditures.
Results prove that for some expenditures groups population structure is important. The
share of young and old people, for example, positively aﬀects spending on leisure goods.
Children’s leisure time should be utilized. Another population demographic who enjoy
cultural events in their domestic municipality are elderly people; they are more interested
in cultural spending because they have a lower opportunity cost of time.
The share of people in a productive age positively aﬀects environmental spending. The
share of university educated people also does. These people care more about environmental
protection, therefore they can be either those who decide upon environmental policy in local
government or those who vote for politicians with a higher preference for good environment.
19According to the survey mentioned in the theoretical section, cooperation is hardly probable.
12Education is also a signiﬁcant determinant for overall capital spending and spending on
industry and infrastructure. People with a university education could have similar interests
as entrepreneurs, or even run their own business.
Concerning budget constraint, municipalities mainly do not react on past deﬁcit, but on
current budget constraints, given by subsidies in our case. The ﬁnancial score was found
to be useful only in the case of current expenditures on municipal services, the greater the
ﬁnancial health of a municipality, the more money is spent on this task.
We can observe interesting eﬀects for political variables. We ﬁnd evidence that left-wing
parties tend to decrease expenditures on industry and infrastructure and at the same time
increase expenditures on culture, sports and recreation.
Party concentration also matters. If parties in the municipality council are more concen-
trated, then spending on housing, utilities and regional development and on overall capital
expenditures are higher. More parties in the local council more likely disagree on huge
investments projects requiring a lot of political and ﬁnancial support. This hypothesis is
supported by Alesina and Drazen (1991) in their analysis of how political struggles delay
reforms, or by the war of attrition model in Alesina et al. (2006).
Additionally, a large city in a neighborhood negatively aﬀects the municipality’s cultural
spending. The municipality tends to free ride on the large city, which has an advantage in
providing cultural goods.
Environmental expenditures speciﬁc controls were found to be signiﬁcant. Large cities are
centers of business life, which produce higher emissions, so they have to spend more. Results
also suggest that municipalities situated at a higher altitude spend less on environmental
protection, probably due to a better natural environment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we sought evidence of the spatial interdependence of local public expenditures
in the Czech Republic. We tested the hypothesis that in their decisions on public spending,
municipality councils take into account the decisions of neighboring municipalities. Inter-
action among municipalities can stem from (i) spillover eﬀects, when residents beneﬁt or
are harmed from the public good provided in a neighboring region; (ii) competition, when
municipalities aim to attract residents and businesses to their region; (iii) mimicking, driven
by yardstick competition or by the incomplete information of councils about costs or the
demand for public goods; (iv) and due to cooperation, because neighboring municipalities
can work on joint projects.
In our analysis, we focused on overall expenditures and various expenditure groups;
industry and infrastructure, culture, sports and recreation, housing, utilities and regional
development, and environmental protection.
By using various tests we found the neighborhood matrix that was relevant for a partic-
ular expenditure type. The matrices were based on distance band from 20 to 30 kilometers
and took into account diﬀerences in municipalities’ characteristics.
Technically, we estimated the municipality’s reaction function and used two diﬀerent
techniques: maximum likelihood and generalized spatial two-stage least squares. If the
spatial error and lag dependence occurred at the same time, the latter one was more appro-
priate.
We found positive spatial interdependence in capital expenditures on culture, sports and
recreation and current and capital expenditures on housing, utilities and regional develop-
ment. We argued that municipalities mimic each other in cultural expenditures, as well as
in current expenditures on municipal services. Additionally, ﬁscal competition occurred in
capital expenditures on housing construction.
Negative spatial interdependence was observed for environmental expenditures and for
capital expenditures on industry and infrastructure. This eﬀect veriﬁes the spillover hy-
pothesis that the beneﬁts of public goods provided in neighboring municipalities spill over
13to the domestic municipality. This was surprising for the latter expenditure group, as it did
not verify the expected hypothesis of ﬁscal competition.
The results also bring interesting eﬀects of political variables. We found weak evidence
that party fragmentation decreased capital expenditures, so the higher the disagreement
among parties in municipality councils, the lower the amount of spending on investment
projects. Similarly, party fragmentation decreased expenditures on housing.
Left-wing parties tended to spend more on culture, sports and recreation, an area from
which mainly residents (and not businesses) beneﬁted. Left-wing voters may also demand
these public goods and services more than right-wing voters. On the other hand, these
parties seemed to spend less on industry and infrastructure.
Although we aimed to assign theoretical models to observed eﬀects of spatial interde-
pendence, we could not always be sure which model it was driven by. In some cases, various
theoretical models could also work simultaneously. In our future research, we will aim to
ﬁnd instruments for how to distinguish these models.
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